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ABSTRACT In this article the author explores aspects of young children’s 
private speech, examining characteristics of their development of discourse 
knowledge in utterances that are not directed to actual conversants. Two routes 
are taken, which the author tries to interlink without seeking a hard and fast 
juncture. The first is a study of what children are doing when they talk into a toy 
telephone, with reference to a transcript taken from empirical research. 
Knowledge of the essential structure of telephone discourse is displayed, as are 
emotional motivations behind the construction of pretence talk. The second is 
the notion of ‘egocentric speech’ as coined by Piaget and developed, within his 
sociocultural perspective to language acquisition, by Vygotsky. The author 
argues that dominant contemporary presentations of Vygotsky’s notion of 
‘egocentric speech’ tend to stress the self-regulatory or planning function at the 
expense of its role in expression of the imagination. The two discussions come 
together in the suggestion that the deployment of the imagination in 
reassembling sociocultural knowledge for the creation of pretence play, 
sometimes expressed in private speech, can be a significant factor in the exercise 
of discourse competencies for young children. 
Introduction 
One December day, Katie, 3 years and 11 months old, walked into a child-sized 
telephone box situated in the nursery that she attended each weekday 
morning. It was near the end of a period of free-choice activities. But the time 
had come to clear up, prior to the well-organised routine of having a snack, 
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visiting the cloakroom and the other whole-group activities which curtailed 
the morning at pre-school. 
As a language development researcher spending 9 months in the nursery 
gathering data on children’s interactions with toy telephones, I was later able 
to play back the video recording of what Katie said. It was not particularly 
remarkable in having any single unusual feature; but, as ethnomethodologists 
such as Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974) have demonstrated, unravelling 
small pieces of discourse that at first sight seem relatively mundane can be 
highly rewarding in discovery of their underlying complexity of organisation. 
Katie’s Pretence Telephone Call 
The time is given in minutes and seconds, followed by Katie’s speech and (in 
italics) Katie’s action. 
 
0.00 dials 
0.01 picks up receiver 
0.02 Mummy, I’m tidying up now and I want to play. Goodbye. 
0.07 almost hangs up; then lifts receiver 
0.08 dials (for approx. 2 seconds) 
0.10 Hello 
0.11 dials (for approx. 4 seconds) 
0.16 Hello yeh bye. Mummy’s poorly bye 
0.19 hangs up 
 
In looking at the data collected for my research on children’s pretence and 
actual dialogic telephone talk I became interested in considering some aspects 
of it in the light of Vygotsky’s (1987b) notion of ‘egocentric speech’. I shall be 
looking at this idea in detail, but initially adumbrate the notion. It is important 
to explain that Vygotsky was here working with a term coined by Piaget 
(1959). Therefore, although he disagreed that ‘egocentricity’ was a 
characteristic of the phenomenon, he continued to use the phrase (and so shall 
I), while carefully maintaining suspicious quotation marks around it. Many 
later writers on ‘egocentric speech’, whether working from Piaget’s theories or 
endeavouring to take into account Vygotsky’s, find that the phenomenon is 
something of a broad term: talking apparently to oneself but very probably in 
the presence of other(s). Piaget (1959) immediately divided this phenomenon 
into three categories, as discussed later. Study of ‘egocentric speech’ has been 
found useful by many researchers of children’s language development (see 
Diaz & Berk, 1992 for a review). In particular, Berk, as reported in her 1992 
overview of many years’ research in the USA, has studied the talk of children 
at school talking to themselves while accomplishing tasks. In this context, she 
relabelled ‘egocentric speech’ as ‘private speech’. The age range studied is 
from 4 to 10 years, and Berk’s particular emphasis is speech-accompanying 
activities that present a cognitive challenge. Shields’s (1979) British study was 
of the natural language of nursery school children playing and showed that 
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any cognitive challenges arise spontaneously and are presented by/to the self 
rather than being initiated by the teacher and/or researcher. In addition, the 
presence of peers is often significant. These differences receive further 
attention later in the article. 
It is important to state that in this article my aim is not to reach an 
overall explanation of data in terms of either Piaget’s or Vygotsky’s notion of 
‘egocentric speech’, however modified. Neither am I trying to achieve a 
definitive resolution of the notion of ‘egocentric speech’ through appeal to 
data. Rather, as Berk and Shields have attempted in their very different ways, I 
bring my reading of data of young children’s talk that is not obviously directed 
to another person, that has been collected in a particular context (in my case in 
play with telephones), and place this with an exploration of Vygotsky’s 
theories concerned with ‘egocentric speech’. I do this in the hope of enhancing 
our overall understanding of children’s discourse development. 
Study Design 
Before discussing further ‘egocentric speech’, I explain part of the rationale 
behind the study in which Katie’s call was produced. How children learn to 
talk on the telephone has been a rarely investigated area, in contrast to how 
they manage other arenas of communicative competence such as talking to 
caregivers or becoming literate. Yet, the telephone does offer a site of 
particular interest. It is ubiquitous in modern life and children are partially 
aware of its function from infancy (Bretherton, 1984). The telephone offers a 
particular challenge to the young child who has invariably developed language 
in face-to-face situations, where both non-verbal cues and a shared 
environment can facilitate the communicative process, along with the 
deployment of linguistic resources. Research into young children learning to 
talk on the telephone concentrates almost entirely upon dialogues between 
young children and adults obtained under artificial conditions (Holmes, 1981; 
Veach, 1981; Bordeaux & Willbrand, 1987; Warren & Tate, 1992; Cameron & 
Lee, 1997; Cameron, et al, 1997). 
A stimulating and relatively holistic approach to the issue of the 
acquisition of telephone discourse was provided by Mininni (1985). Although 
very small scale and limited in coverage, this study was inspirational to me in 
its joint focus upon children’s naturalistically obtained telephone conversations 
and their earlier or overlapping spontaneous pretence play with toy, or actual, 
yet unconnected phones. Mininni’s suggestion that children displayed very 
competent, albeit one-sided, ‘participations’ in telephone discourse in pretence 
mode before they were able to converse with equally fluent use of linguistic 
resources in dialogue, led me to study telephone talk as emerging in pretence 
play and evolving in actual telephone dialogue. Pretence play has a central role 
in many accounts of child development (Kohlberg & Fein, 1987). Especially 
relevant to my study have been Vygotsky’s (1967) notion of pretence play as a 
sphere where children aspire to and even practise skills they are not yet 
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allowed to demonstrate in the arena of adult social life, children’s creativity in 
the construction of roles and narratives (Garvey, 1977), and the consequent 
development of sociolinguistic competencies (Andersen, 1990). 
Data were collected from spontaneous play with telephones during 
sessions of pretence play by 3 and 4 year-old children in a nursery attached to a 
school in Lancashire. I also spent considerable time observing, and sometimes 
participating in, other activities in the nursery. I recorded and later transcribed 
the telephone talk of 19 children in the ‘afternoon group’, who were at the 
nursery throughout the three phases of the study from November 1995 to June 
1996. In the first phase, an unobtrusive small video camera was mounted in a 
child-size replica of a typical British pavement telephone box with a telephone 
installed in it. The activity of the children in and around the telephone was 
recorded. 
Heeding Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) criticisms of overly artificial designs for 
studies of child development, I claim a considerable degree of ‘ecological 
validity’ for the study. Although the study was not naturalistic in that the 
researcher contrived the situation, it was in the nature of opportunity offered 
to the children within which they could choose whether or not, and how to 
participate. Following the example of such research into young children’s 
development of new communicative competencies, as described by Robinson 
et al (1981), it was felt necessary that the children’s parents and teachers 
considered the opportunity potentially beneficial. The research design was 
constructed with regard to fitting in to the classroom routine and facilities, to 
the ‘human sense’ that was made of it by the children (Donaldson, 1987) and 
to allow sensitive, long-term observation of the children in their own worlds 
(see Corsaro, 1985; Hammersley, 1994). It permitted micro-genetic 
observation of the activity of children acting with peers and/or adults that was 
a feature of Vygotsky’s (1962, 1987a) work, but was underpinned with the 
careful discourse analysis of contemporary developmental sociolinguistic 
studies of pretence play (e.g. Andersen, 1990). 
The Notion of ‘Egocentric Speech’ 
Piaget’s proposal of the notion of ‘egocentric speech’ (1959) is well known. He 
suggested that much of the talk young children utter, which is apparently not 
directed to another as with adult conversation, is ‘egocentric’ in character: 
[The child] does not bother to know to whom he is speaking nor whether he is 
being listened to. He talks either for himself or for the pleasure of associating 
anyone who happens to be there with the activity of the moment. This talk is ego-
centric, partly because the child speaks only about himself, but chiefly because he 
does not attempt to place himself at the point of view of his hearer. (Piaget, 1959, 
p. 9) 
He distinguished three categories of ‘egocentric speech’: repetition or 
echolalia, collective monologue, and monologue or ‘soliloquy’. Research in 
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the 1970s reviewed by Shields (1979) effectively reclassified the first category as 
social play, and Shields herself convincingly argued from her own data that 
‘collective monologue’ is essentially social: for example, a manifestation of the 
child learning to cope with the social problem of entering a new type of group 
dynamics such as peer play in a nursery setting. This leaves the kind of 
‘egocentric speech’ that Piaget (1959) described as follows: ‘The child talks to 
himself as though he were thinking aloud. He does not address anyone’ (p. 9). 
It might be asserted that this can have nothing to do with (pretence) talking on 
the telephone, a deliberate fantasy activity in which children delight in 
addressing an imaginary interlocutor. However, I contend that if the 
Vygotskian view of ‘egocentric speech’ is taken on board, then the activity of 
‘pretence talking on the telephone’ takes on a new significance. 
Followers of Vygotsky have grasped an essential difference between 
Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s conception of ‘egocentric speech’, founded upon the 
radical contrast in their depictions of the young child (see, for example, Berk, 
1994; Wertsch & Stone, 1985). For Vygotsky, the genesis of the higher 
psychological functions including language is in social activity. Language is 
used to and in the presence of the child. Processes of communication including 
language are rooted in social interactions. Gradually their meanings are 
internalised and comprehended linguistically as the child strives actively to 
make more precisely known her or his concerns and intentions within present 
social relations. ‘Egocentric speech’ develops from an undifferentiated social 
speech as the child moves toward the later-achieved differentiation of inner 
speech (verbalised thought) and external, communicative speech function 
(Vygotsky, 1987b, pp. 74, 113). At the age of 3, therefore, there is little 
difference between ‘egocentric’ and communicative speech, whereas by age 7, 
the former is adopting many of the structural characteristics of inner speech 
and thus is easily perceived by observers as very different from directed 
conversational speech (Vygotsky, 1987b, p. 261). For Piaget, ‘egocentric 
speech’ atrophied as the child developed into a social being, while for 
Vygotsky it ‘went underground’ and evolved into inner speech (Wertsch & 
Stone, 1985, p. 172). Vygotsky himself suggested that it is as absurd to imagine 
that ‘egocentric speech’ dies out, as it is to imagine that the ability to count 
vanishes when the child no longer uses fingers or utters numbers aloud 
(Vygotsky, 1987b, p. 261). 
Vygotsky’s own series of experimental investigations (as described in 
Vygotsky 1962, 1987a; Vygotsky & Luria, 1930) remain particularly persuasive 
demonstrations of the social nature of ‘egocentric speech’. He measured 
young children’s output of ‘egocentric speech’ while engaged in activities in 
changing conditions. He agreed with Piaget (1959, p. 9) that children have a 
certain ‘illusion of understanding’, that is, with reference to the present 
‘audience’, but showed how important this was to the motivation behind 
‘egocentric speech’. When the ‘audience’ was interfered with, for example by 
being composed of children the subjects knew to be deaf or not speaking their 
language, or when vocalisations were drowned out by an orchestra recruited 
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to play on the other side of a screen (!), or simply if a subject child is left alone, 
then the production of ‘egocentric speech’ fell sharply. Thus, Vygotsky’s 
emphasis on the social characteristic of all language in use has received 
considerable empirical support. 
Vygotsky’s notion of ‘egocentric speech’ is founded in a conception of 
the acquisition of language as essentially sociocultural, in contrast to the 
Chomskian/nativist emphasis on an innate language capacity unfurled 
through maturation with exposure to a specific language (see, for example, 
Pinker, 1994). However, beyond its place within a sociocultural account of 
language development, further refinement of the notion of ‘egocentric speech’ 
has happened in a very particular and, I contend, ultimately somewhat 
misleading way. Part of Vygotsky’s account has been seized upon in an 
unbalanced way and another part left behind. 
The function of ‘egocentric speech’ that is now taken by those who are 
applying and even developing Vygotskian ideas, as principal, dominant or even 
essentially sole, is that of a self-regulatory or planning function. I give two 
examples taken from often-cited Vygotskian research programmes. 
In a passage in which Wertsch & Stone (1985) interpret Vygotsky’s 
notion of ‘egocentric speech’, they seemingly have room for no other aspect of 
function: 
Vygotsky argued that the reason for the appearance of this intermediate speech 
form is that this new self-regulative function of speech is still not completely 
differentiated from earlier social functions. The failure to appreciate the existence 
of this new speech function leads the child temporarily to continue using overt, 
self-regulative speech and to produce such speech in potentially communicative 
settings. (p. 172) 
Wertsch’s (1985) application of Vygotsky’s theories to the study of adult–child 
dialogues is renowned. It is interesting to note that although studies of adult–
child dyads frequently cite his work, Vygotsky himself ‘never discussed these 
situations and instead focused more upon culture as providing tools for 
thinking’ (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1994, p. 6). In the chapter co-written with 
Stone cited earlier, Wertsch presents an excellent demonstration of how 
mother–child problem-solving dialogue of directed speech becomes 
internalised into the child planning for herself or himself through the 
intermediate stage of ‘egocentric speech’. 
This is the ‘private speech’ that Berk and her fellow contributors to the 
1992 volume Private Speech: from social interaction to self-regulation, studied. As is 
clear in the title and discussed within the book, Diaz & Berk consider their 
notion of private speech as self-regulatory to be synonymous with Vygotsky’s 
‘egocentric speech’. In studies spanning more than a decade, Berk (1992, 1994) 
focused on the link between talking to oneself and learning, stressing the idea 
that self-regulatory or planning speech can be a useful accompaniment to a 
difficult task, a resource even for adults. Berk (1992, 1994) addressed such 
questions as: do slow learners use more or less ‘private speech’ than quick 
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learners; do some cultural groups tend to use it more or less than others; and 
should we respond to any such difference with intervention? These are 
worthwhile areas of enquiry. 
My intention is to focus on Berk’s notion of ‘egocentric speech’ as a 
reflection of Vygotsky’s, as it is a relationship that Berk claims. Berk (1994) says 
that ‘self-guidance is the central function of private speech’ (p. 62) and cites 
Vygotsky for her argument that ‘private speech facilitates self-regulation’ (p. 
63). Her evidence occasionally includes other, quite different roles that private 
speech can play including ‘fantasy play’ and ‘emotional release’, but it is as an 
accompaniment to action, a form of self-direction that she and Wertsch & 
Stone (1985) consider to be of prime importance. What a surprise, then, to find 
that Vygotsky (1987b) actually wrote of ‘egocentric speech’: ‘It is not an 
accompaniment of the child’s activity’ (p. 259). What is the explanation for the 
apparent contradiction here? 
It is true that in their writings Vygotsky and indeed Piaget stressed the 
aspect of ‘egocentric speech’ that is self-regulatory and indeed some kind of a 
commentary on action. This led to an emphasis by followers (including early 
translators of Vygotsky) on this function. However, I suggest that this aspect 
received particular attention because of the comparative novelty of the 
suggestion. This was the era when both men were drawing on each other’s 
work with mutual respect and it is useful to remember the long shadow cast 
over all serious students of child psychology by Freud. In relation to Piaget, 
this influence is emphasised by Kohlberg & Fein (1987, p. 393) and in relation 
to Vygotsky, received its clearest acknowledgement in his short piece written 
with Luria (Vygotsky & Luria), made available in 1994. The internal life of the 
child in imagination and the significance of unconscious impulses were greatly 
appreciated by the 1930s (as in the present day, considered necessarily 
inaccessible to precise, quantifiable research methodologies). Reading 
Vygotsky’s extensive writings on ‘egocentric speech’, I find a more well-
rounded account than in the selective presentations of Berk (1992, 1994) and 
Wertsch & Stone (1985), who have tended to regard the ideas of Piaget and 
Vygotsky as requiring less justification in their discussions of ‘egocentric 
speech’. In many passages, Vygotsky passes quickly over an acceptance of the 
imaginative, expressive nature of ‘egocentric speech’ in order to present the 
comparatively newly recognised aspect of a sometimes present self-regulatory 
function: 
Egocentric speech may, in fact, function as a component of realistic thinking. 
Egocentric speech may be fused not with the logic of dream or fantasy but with the 
logic of rational, goal-directed action and thinking. (Vygotsky, 1987b, p. 73) 
This second type of ‘logic’ received most attention by Vygotsky as previously 
having been overlooked. Later commentators follow his line of emphasis, 
identified in passages such as: 
Alongside the purely expressive function of egocentric speech, its tendency to 
simply accompany the child’s activity, this process becomes thinking in the true 
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sense of the term. It assumes the function of a planning operation or the function 
of resolving a problem that arises in behaviour. (Vygotsky, 1987b, p. 114) 
Therefore, attention to ‘the logic of dream and fantasy’, and ‘the purely 
expressive function’ of ‘egocentric speech’ came to be overlooked. Much of 
Vygotsky’s writing on ‘egocentric speech’ emphasises the role of ‘egocentric 
speech’ in accompanying cognitively challenging activities. Moreover, this 
path has been developed so fruitfully by Berk, as discussed earlier. 
However, Vygotsky’s (1987b) clearest summary passage paints a more 
holistic picture of the role of ‘egocentric speech’: 
the function of egocentric speech is closely related to the function of inner speech. It 
is not an accompaniment of the child’s activity. It is an independent melody or 
function that facilitates intellectual orientation, conscious awareness, the 
overcoming of difficulties and impediments, and imagination and thinking. It is 
speech for oneself (a speech function that intimately serves the child’s thinking). 
The genetic fate of egocentric speech is much different from that depicted by 
Piaget. Egocentric speech develops along not a falling but a rising curve. Its 
development is not an involution but a true evolution ... Our hypothesis suggests 
that egocentric speech is speech that is internal in its mental function and external 
in its structure. It is fated to develop into inner speech. (pp. 259–260) 
Pretence Telephone Talk 
A return to the data is surely overdue. Before any analysis of the content of 
what Katie says, I need to consider whether the phenomenon of pretence play 
with a telephone in the context of a discussion can be seen as ‘egocentric 
speech’. If Vygotsky’s analysis is accepted, then the data are of a highly 
relevant nature. 
If a young child picks up a telephone and plays with it, then it is not 
necessary to speak into it. As one might expect from Vygotsky’s emphasis on 
the sociocultural nature of language acquisition, children have been observed 
vocalising ‘correctly’ (i.e. making sounds only when holding the telephone up 
near the head, directing noise in the area of the mouthpiece) from as young as 
14 months old. I have a video recording of such a child, Laura (Gillen, 1997a), 
playing in this way with a telephone for the duration of over 1 minute. Later, 
when children clearly understand the communicative function of a connected 
telephone and differentiate their own toy from which no voice will ever 
emerge, they choose to couch their pretence talk in the framework of 
telephone discourse. The data from this study revealed knowledge of the 
anatomy of telephone calls drawn upon in pretence and dialogic constructions 
(Gillen, 1998). The most necessary elements of telephone discourse: openings, 
closings and signs of turn-taking, (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Schegloff, 1979; 
Hopper, 1992) appear early and continue to structure later talk until and long 
after it becomes as complicated as Katie’s. 
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Katie’s pretence telephone call is rare amongst data collected in this 
study in that it does not begin with ‘hello’ or ‘hiya’. As with most such calls, 
further examination does reveal recognition of the need for an opening in 
more than one way. For Katie’s opening ‘Mummy’ has something in the 
nature of the vocative about it, the address that can begin a speech directed to 
another (as particularly clearly evidenced in Latin with its use of the vocative 
inflection). After she has made a contentful statement, Katie brings the call to a 
close with ‘goodbye’ and prepares to replace the receiver. As was the case for a 
number of children in other pretence calls, preparing to replace the receiver 
seemed to trigger a self-correction; a realization that the rapid delivery of the 
strongly motivated ‘message’ caused an omission of the proper preliminaries. 
The use of the ‘vocative’ is now felt to have been not quite an adequate 
opening. Accordingly, Katie started again, lifting the receiver and dialling 
(again a virtually ubiquitous precursor to a pretence call). 
This time she says ‘Hello’, dials again and makes what I came to regard 
as the canonical short pretence call: beginning with ‘Hello’, ending in ‘bye’, 
with merely monosyllabic phatic acknowledgements or signs of turn-taking in 
between (I borrow the notion of a canonical call from Hopper’s 1992 
inductively derived work on canonical constituents of adults’ telephone calls). 
In a sense, her mission of making a pretence telephone call is now complete. 
On many occasions, pretence calls of this nature and structure seemingly 
satisfied the children’s impulses. However, on this occasion, something else 
came to the front of her internal life that required final expression. I am not 
going to be so literal minded as to assert that Katie’s mother was necessarily ill 
at that time and that Katie was expressing her real anxiety. It seems to be that 
pretending to talk to her mother has brought the figure of her mother firmly 
into her imagination and she ended expressing a thought about her. Mothers 
were very frequently the characterisations evoked as imaginary interlocutors 
and this occurred almost automatically, even if the call contained only the 
basic structural elements identified earlier. 
Here I think it very possible that Katie’s original motivation to express 
herself came from her recognition of the fact that ‘tidy up time’ had come, the 
precursor of activities connected with getting ready to go home, while she felt 
somewhat frustrated in the curtailment of her play activities. The pretence 
telephone offered a stimulus to her to express this idea – and emotion – 
verbally: a kind of encouraging force or even amplifier (and literally so) of 
‘egocentric speech’. 
Sociocultural knowledge of the structure of telephone calls is brought 
into the structuring of expression in pretence telephone calls. The socially 
conventional routines of telephone discourse, the dialogic skills of turn-taking 
and addressing, even responding to the other, and not least the imaginative 
and emotional evocations and activities belonging to the realm of pretence 
play become the resources that children draw upon when constructing 
telephone talk. Katie’s ‘call’ is perhaps two or more attempts at making a call, 
each with its opening, closing and some appropriate mid-part. Her pauses, the 
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construction of her turns, are at least as significant an achievement as the 
semantic content of her utterances, in interactional terms. Children re-create 
the communicative routines they link to recognised contexts, often pushing 
the boundaries of their pre-existing linguistic abilities as they do so (Bloom, 
1993; Gillen, 1997a). The act of the 14 month-old Laura in lifting the telephone 
receiver and vocalising into it, a sound that will soon become ‘hello’, is a 
manifestation of children actively making use of resources given substance and 
form by the culture around them. 
Conclusions 
Whether it is fair to judge pretence calls as exemplars of ‘egocentric speech’ or 
not does not finally matter too much. I have made a case that pretence 
telephone calls may be regarded in this light. Talking on a telephone that the 
child knows will bring about no actual response is a kind of performance for 
oneself. Thus, explanations of pretence calls as manifestations of ‘egocentric 
speech’ can make use of Vygotsky’s account of the social genesis of speech. 
Analysis of children’s talk to themselves, while allowing them to 
maintain control over that world, has the potential to illuminate their route to 
communicative competence in a holistic way. This ‘egocentric speech’ 
involves more than either the acquisition of particular routines or the 
overcoming of cognitive challenges, important as these are. ‘Egocentric 
speech’ is constituted by the expression of the child’s imagination in an 
environment that is profoundly coloured by subjective perceptions and 
relationships, and given potential forms through culturally derived 
interpretations. 
The reader might prefer a weaker case, in which I succeed in drawing 
some links between the manifestations of pretence play that I studied and 
‘egocentric speech’. In this event, I can draw attention to something of a 
possible bridge in the work of Shields (1979), who studied ‘egocentric speech’ 
as it arose in the course of spontaneous play among pre-schooler children. She 
characterised imaginative monologues (i.e. Piaget’s category of ‘monologue’ 
[soliloquy]; see earlier), as follows: 
The monologues seems [sic] to be typical examples of elaborated play in which 
the experiences of reality are brought in to structure the current activity. 
This process may take place in play interaction, or it may be exhibited as in these 
monologues entirely under the control of the child. (Shields, 1979, p. 265; my 
emphasis) 
These words are an apposite description of what I found in the children’s 
telephone calls, across both the pretence and dialogic conditions. How socially 
oriented any utterance might be deemed was a far more complex issue than 
simply whether or not the telephone was connected to another person. Katie 
almost automatically addressed her mother in her pretence call. This then 
brought that figure into the foreground of subject matter, demanding some 
VYGOTSKY’S ‘EGOCENTRIC SPEECH’  
181 
kind of expression. Shields’s formulation brings out the interaction between 
the ‘pretence’ and the ‘real’ world as they are brought together in the unified 
(in another sense) existence of the child and suggests how speech routines of 
culturally defined discourses, here telephone discourse, are used as essential 
linguistic resources. For these are the structuring experiences of reality, as they 
appear in language. 
Pretence calls, as ‘egocentric speech’, may occur in the presence of 
adults. However, neither are they elicited nor under adults’ control. They 
belong to the child, and sometimes, to the world of pretence play they inhabit 
with peers. Having regard to children’s private speech hardly fits the current 
emphasis in the United Kingdom pre-school system upon children’s output, 
upon their successfully achieved communications, with adults above all. 
It is often believed that Vygotsky’s work did not reach the West until the 
1960s, and is essentially ‘true’ in that attention slowly started to build after the 
initial publication of an English translation of Thought and Language in 1962. It 
has generally been overlooked that in 1929 Vygotsky sent a report on his 
investigations into ‘egocentric speech’ to the Ninth International Congress of 
Psychology at New Haven, concluding: ‘We thus consider egocentric speech 
as one of the most important processes having a specific function in the 
evolution of the cultural behavior of the child’ (Vygotsky & Luria, 1930, p. 
465). 
Note 
An earlier version of this article was presented to the British Educational 
Research Association annual conference in Belfast, August 1998. I am grateful 
for useful subsequent discussions and suggestions from Ian Stronach, Nigel 
Hall, the CIEC editors and two anonymous reviewers. 
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Dr Julia Gillen, Research Centre, Manchester Metropolitan University, 799 
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